The Secretary Problem with Independent Sampling

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Background


 \rightarrow The secretary problem is probably the most well-studied optimal stopping problem with many applications.

 \rightarrow One of its limitations for modeling real-world situations is the assumption that the online values are completely unknown. On the other hand, assuming that a distribution from where the values are drawn is fully known might be too optimistic.

 \rightarrow Particularly when unexpected events might happen, even assuming a distribution from which we can sample might be strong. We want to combine the idea of having samples representing past data with having arbitrary values chosen adversarially.

- \rightarrow We propose a robust framework that
 - 1) incorporates past experience
 - is more general than explicitly assuming a distribution
 does not take as input the exact number of elements arriving.

A new model with sampling




^[2] Goldstein G.D., McAfee P.R., Suri S., Wright J.R., Learning when to stop searching, Management Science, 2020.

[4] Esfandiari, H., HajiAghayi, M., Lucier, B., Mitzenmacher, M. Prophets, secretaries, and maximizing theprobability of choosing the best, AISTATS 2020.

Results

We obtain best possible algorithms for both orders and for **any** value of *p*.



Adversarial order

Single-threshold algorithm depending only on *p*. Prove optimality: Transform problem & combinatorial arguments on a **conflict graph**.


Random order

Fixed sequence of decreasing thresholds in time.

Extensions and applications

 \rightarrow A convenient framework to study combinatorial problems with additional information (e.g., online matchings [1], matroid secretary problems).

 \rightarrow The thresholds for the random order seem to nicely capture the strategies that agents develop when playing repeatedly the secretary problem with an unknown distribution [2]. Ongoing work: Can we provide a different explanation than [2], namely that players are playing close to optimal all along?



^[3] Gilbert J., Mosteller F., Recognizing the maximum of a sequence, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 1966.